The data show that aggression toward neighboring countries generally favors Russian President Vladimir Putin at home. The rapid improvement in attitudes toward Putin and the lack of lasting consequences could explain why the Kremlin repeats even ineffective tactics. The potential payoff is high. Maintaining power is a life-or-death matter for Putin today. The cost to both the leadership and the Russian public has not dissuaded either that aggression abroad is unwise.

Whether the tactics, like energy blackmail, are judged to be successful depends upon the aim of these actions. Russia’s continued aggression abroad has done more than increase the government’s approval rates. It also has achieved a desired geopolitical outcome: Preventing or delaying states from joining NATO. If the objective has been to delay or deter accession to NATO, then Russia has succeeded with Georgia and Ukraine.

Just as Putin has adapted to the surrounding system, NATO can too. The boost in support associated with taking military action–if genuinely explained by it–is remarkable and lasting. Still, approval consistently wanes when Putin violates the unspoken norms of their social contract, as with raising the age for pensions or mobilizing them to fight in Ukraine. NATO can adapt to the current situation, which seems to incentivize these behaviors from multiple angles.

Policymakers who wish to deter Russia from what is now a well-worn series of tactics must tie aggression abroad to costs that the Russian people will perceive as violating Putin’s social contract with his subjects. The common behaviors or happenstances accompanying Russian escalation and aggression are detailed here.

In 2008, Hedenskog predicted the invasion of Ukraine shortly after the Russian war with Georgia earlier that year.¹ He notes that Ukraine has several risk factors and is without a way to protect itself from Russia:

When Hedenskog wrote the excerpt, Russia had already acted covertly in Crimea. Credible media had heavily covered the “separatists” in Ukraine and thus lent legitimacy to the Kremlin’s claims about Ukrainians who wanted to be Russians.² Tactics commonly used in science denialism, like the magnified minority, appear to have contributed to the overestimation of “pro-Russian separatist” support.

Although Russia was aggressive toward Estonia, notably during Estonia’s relocation of the Bronze Soldier,³ the threat from NATO likely encouraged Russian restraint. Compare that with the treatment of Montenegro, which NATO hesitated to accept. The GRU later plotted to kill Prime Minister Milo Djukanovic to dissuade the country from joining NATO.⁴

Despite this extreme act, Montenegro joined in 2017, but the two years between its invitation to join and its actual accession permitted Russia to act. Montenegrins have elected a pro-NATO leader every year since they gained their independence in 2006, so the desire to join NATO alone was not enough to trigger such treachery.⁵

Russia’s behavior incentivizes countries to join NATO by unleashing wanton devastation against non-NATO states while exercising restraint toward NATO countries. The Second Chechen War was part of the motivation for Georgia and Ukraine to join. Headlines can largely convey the sequence of events:

Although some conclude that allowing new members into NATO somehow increases the risk of violence, no evidence supports this claim. Decades of evidence show the precise opposite.

Russia threatened nuclear retaliation in Sweden, and Finland joined NATO.⁶ When the two joined, Russia pretended the situation made “no big difference.”⁷ Juxtapose this sequence of events against what happens when NATO meets expressions of interest with hesitation and delay, as with Georgia and Ukraine. With more time between the decision and accession, Russia might have likely attempted to dissuade both countries.

Nuclear threats have become something of a standard potential response to anything that offends Russia:

We see a grand promise: Anyone may join. When countries face serious security threats, an obvious impetus for interest a desire to join NATO, their interest is often met with hesitation or delay, leaving them vulnerable to sabotage and military action from Russia.

Russia understands the rules–though it certainly doesn’t follow them–which is why it threatens other countries’ territorial integrity.

NATO must also learn from the situation and find a path to NATO membership that removes the incentive to attack. Consequences for aggression that lead Putin to violate the Russian social contract may be most effective.